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 The Transfer of Japanese Manufacturing
 Management Approaches to U. S. Industry
 RICHARD J. SCHONBERGER
 University of Nebraska-Lincoln
 Just-in-time (JIT) provisioning of manufacturing inventories is a notable
 feature of Japanese manufacturing management. Kawasaki Motors, USA,
 has committed itself to JIT objectives, which result in moving toward
 lotless repetitive manufacturing, a streamlined mode of operation
 characterized by minimal inventories and "shop paper," plus flexible
 market response. Kawasaki USA has forged a hybrid process of effecting
 change, featuring Japanese JIT objectives but without Japanese-style con-
 sensus mechanisms for making decisions and effecting changes.
 Japanese expertise in repetitive manufacturing
 management emerged as the marvel of the in-
 dustrial world in the 1970s. Japanese companies
 generally have not been secretive about their special
 management skills and approaches, but Western in-
 dustry has been slow to learn about and profit from
 Japanese successes, partly because of a prevailing
 premise that Japanese socioeconomic, geographic,
 and cultural factors rather than management ap-
 proaches explain their successes.
 Today, however, many manufacturers are study-
 ing and trying out Japanese approaches. Much of
 the activity has centered around quality circles
 (Nelson, 1980), a concept in which small groups of
 workers meet periodically to explore ways to im-
 prove quality and productivity. Only recently have
 Western manufacturers become aware of the Jap-
 anese kanban system and just-in-time (JIT) man-
 ufacturing control. In this paper, JIT, kanban, and
 quality circles are considered in the context of a par-
 ticular type of production: repetitive manufactur-
 ing. As an illustration, the evolving repetitive
 manufacturing management system of a Japanese
 plant operating on U.S. shores-Kawasaki Motors-
 is considered.
 'The research leading to this paper was supported in part by a
 fellowship awarded by the Center for the Study of the American
 Business System.
 Repetitive Manufacturing
 and JIT Parts Delivery
 Industrial processes all too often have been over-
 simplified with dichotomous terms such as job
 shop-flow shop or intermittent-continuous. High
 volume assembly of TVs, toys, pharmaceuticals,
 and canned goods sometimes is considered as con-
 tinuous process production even though assembly
 runs are in lots and may be controlled by job orders
 or lot orders as in a job shop. The American Pro-
 duction and Inventory Control Society (APICS)
 (1981) is attempting to popularize terminology that
 will distinguish between the true process industries,
 whose products may be counted in fractional parts
 (gases, fluids, grains, flakes, pellets), and the in-
 dustries that make discrete units in large amounts.
 The term being suggested for the latter is repetitive
 manufacturing.
 In Western industrialized countries planning and
 control by lots is the dominant pattern in repetitive
 manufacturing. The Japanese have developed sys-
 tems of repetitive manufacturing that attempt to do
 away with lots, that is, move toward lotless
 manufacturing. Lotless operations are the norm in
 the continuous process industries, and some repet-
 itive manufacturers have been able to achieve lotless
 final assembly either by (a) dedicated assembly lines
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 each making only a single model, as in automobile
 assembly, or (b) running mixed models down a single
 line, as is the practice in some tractor assembly
 plants. But in Western countries subassembly,
 fabrication, and purchasing in support of final
 assembly generally is lot-oriented. The Japanese
 have had some success in extending lotless repetitive
 processing to levels below final assembly, that is,
 multiechelon lotless manufacturing, and also in ex-
 panding the pursuit of lotless processing to firms
 making a wide variety of consumer and industrial
 products.
 One Japanese technique for facilitating relatively
 lotless processing is the Toyota kanban system.
 Kanban was introduced at Toyota in 1972, and to
 date only a few other large Japanese original equip-
 ment manufacturing (OEM) companies have imple-
 mented kanban (APICS, 1981). The detailed work-
 ings of the kanban system are explained elsewhere
 (Sugimori, Kusunoki, Cho, & Uchikawa, 1977) and
 need not be dwelt on here. As interesting as kanban
 is, it is but one manifestation of a widespread
 Japanese manufacturing management approach
 characterized by simplicity and avoidance of waste.
 The approach bears close scrutiny for the purposes
 of this paper, which are to develop some prelim-
 inary judgments about the feasibility of transferring
 Japanese management expertise to U.S. industry.
 The Japanese live on a small, crowded collection
 of islands where space costs are at a premium and
 natural resources are scarce. Waste, in the form of
 defective production or idle inventories taking up
 floor space, is a more obvious problem and serious
 concern in Japan than in countries blessed with
 natural abundance. It is not surprising that Japanese
 industry has developed hand-to-mouth manufactur-
 ing and inventory approaches with emphasis on high
 quality.
 A term that has emerged to describe the Japanese
 hand-to-mouth philosophy is JIT. JIT is incor-
 porated to a high degree in the kanban system. That
 is, the Toyota kanban system is geared to providing
 major assemblies just in time to go into final end
 products at the proper final assembly line work sta-
 tion; subassemblies just in time to go into major
 assemblies; parts just in time to go into sub-
 assemblies; and so on down to the level of the pur-
 chased part-and even beyond that into and through-
 out the manufacturing stages in suppliers' plants.
 Material requirements planning (MRP), a U.S.
 innovation, has a similarity to kanban in that MRP
 also is bent on providing parts when they are needed
 to go into a parent item, up through all levels in the
 product structure. The difference is that Japanese
 JIT means, generally, the right day or even hour;
 MRP usually is content to provide parts in the right
 week. MRP can and sometimes does operate with
 daily or smaller time buckets, but there is an
 economic reason why most Western factories have
 weekly buckets: Labor costs of setup dictate that
 orders for the same part often be grouped into lots
 of a size sufficient to cover up to several weeks'
 parent-item requirements. With production quan-
 tities often providing weeks' worth, there is little
 value in regenerating planned orders more often
 than weekly.
 The Japanese also must live with the economics
 of lot-sizing. But they have concentrated on altering
 one of the key inputs, labor cost per setup, in the
 basic economic order quantity equation. Reducing
 the setup cost and thereby adjusting economic lot
 sizes downward-ideally to equal one-is one of the
 keys that allows the Japanese factory to deliver parts
 just in time. When orders are small and frequent,
 simple noncomputer-based systems for order gen-
 eration become practicable. The following example
 explains further the JIT approach of minimum lot
 sizes in contrast with the job-lot approach that has
 been perfected largely in the United States.
 Lot-Size Economics
 Figure 1 shows some of the major differences be-
 tween the JIT and the job-lot approach to manufac-
 turing. Motorcycle manufacturing is used as the ex-
 ample. Part A of Figure 1 shows the familiar job-lot
 way. Materials are bought, parts are fabricated,
 subassemblies are made, and assemblies are built in
 large enough lots that there generally are significant
 stocks of parts between each process stage. A
 schedule for this approach is shown at the right in
 Figure 1, Part A. The schedule, stated in weeks,
 shows intermittent runs of different models of the
 given part. In this case the part is a motorcycle
 frame, but it could just as well be a crank, bracket,
 seat, bolt, or any other material, part, assembly, or
 the whole motorcycle. A high carrying cost rate
 coupled with high cost per setup leads to an inter-
 mediate lot size-the EOQ-which is shown in the
 cost diagram in Part A.
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 Figure 1
 Motorcycle Manufacturing With and Without Lotsa
 A. Production in Lots
 4 ASSEMBLY
 MPS
 FRAN
 FRAN
 FRAN
 ENGI
 WEEK
 1 2 3
 dE X 2000
 dE Y 1000
 dE Z 3000
 NE A 900
 B. Lotless Production
 ' ASSEMBLY
 ORDER-PROCESSING
 /& SETUP COST
 COST ' CARRYING COST
 PER
 PERIOD I
 I FIXED COST
 (ENGINEERING AND
 I MATERIALS MANAGEMENT)
 EOQ = 1
 QUANTITY (LOT SIZE)
 aAdapted from Schonberger, 1981.
 MRP may be used advantageously in the job-lot
 approach of Part A. MRP plans the timing of the
 lot so that it is in time for the next demand. Because
 job-lots typically are several days' or weeks' worth,
 it is generally sufficient that MRP due dates/release
 dates be planned once a week. The many disruptions
 MPS-FRAME SEQUENCING SCHEDULE
 DAY FRAME QUANTITY
 102 X 50
 Z 80
 103 Z 25
 Y 30
 X 50
 that conflict with the schedule during the week are
 handled by priority control (dispatching).
 The JIT approach attempts to carry the MRP goal
 of correct order timing much farther; the ultimate
 or ideal would be piece for piece delivery of parts.
 The effect, shown in Figure 1, Part B, is virtual
 481
 COST
 PER
 PERIOD
 elimination of the large stocks of parts between
 process stages. The schedule becomes a daily or
 twice daily or hourly quantity.
 The cost diagram in Part B represents the altered
 lot-size economics that make JIT possible. The carry-
 ing cost rate is unchanged, but setup cost is greatly
 reduced, as evidenced by the nearly flat, rather than
 steep, setup cost curve. Setup cost reductions are
 achieved by spending heavily on production engi-
 neering. (This exchanges one obvious cost for
 another, but in so doing there are considerable
 derivative benefits of inventory reductions and
 smoothed production, as is explained below.) That
 is, engineers design machines for quick and easy
 changeover of fixtures, dies, and other tooling. The
 fixed cost of engineering for quick setup is high, but
 the tradeoff is a low variable cost for labor to per-
 form setups for changing part numbers. For parts
 that are bought rather than made, the same principle
 may apply, but the reduction is in purchase order-
 processing cost rather than setup cost. Order-
 processing cost cuts may be attained by better long
 term materials management-for example, better
 vendor selection, deliberate encouragement of local
 area vendors, better and longer term vendor con-
 tracts, and close vendor relations and contract
 monitorship.
 Competitive Niche
 A company that produces in large volume may, it
 seems, decide on either the job-lot approach or the
 repetitive approach. To some extent, the choice
 seems forced by the firm's competitive niche. That
 is, a company that manufactures telephones in
 many styles and colors may have great difficulty
 making JIT/repetitive production work, even if
 total sales volume is huge. Computer-based MRP,
 with a daily dispatch list feature, seems preferable
 for planning and controlling the great and ever-
 changing variety of possible telephone configura-
 tions demanded by customers who mainly want to
 be different. Another type of telephone manufac-
 turing is the factory that makes a small variety of
 standard telephone sets in large volume-more of a
 "focused factory" (Skinner, 1974). This producer
 has fewer complications in need of sorting out by
 computer. Repetitive rather than job-lot production
 seems suitable.
 These two examples represent extremes, and in
 the extreme case of differentiated versus standard-
 ized products the choice of job-lot or repetitive
 systems may be forced. But most manufacturers are
 more in the middle than at the extreme, and those
 firms with intermediate degrees of product differen-
 tiation may choose to put their emphasis on variety,
 or they may instead choose to emphasize lower costs
 and prices. It would appear that OEM companies in
 the United States tend toward the former-the vari-
 ety strategy-and the Japanese OEM companies
 tend toward the low price and high quality strategy.
 But in overall head-to-head competition the Jap-
 anese have been having the edge, which leads one to
 wonder if U.S. emphasis has been misplaced. It is
 instructive to consider the case of one U.S. firm
 that recently reversed itself and chose a lotless/JIT
 rather than an MRP future for itself.
 JIT at Kawasaki, USA
 In early 1980 the Kawasaki motorcycle plant in
 Lincoln, Nebraska, was about to implement an
 MRP system. The plant management team were all
 North Americans with experience in job-lot oriented
 U.S. industry but were also knowledgeable about
 the Japanese JIT and kanban system in use at
 Kawasaki, Japan.
 The kanban system for triggering parts movement
 and production appeared feasible, but, more im-
 portantly, the job-lot orientation inherent in MRP
 seemed inappropriate. If Kawasaki, Lincoln, was to
 be able to serve the North American market at a
 lower cost than could Kawasaki, Japan, it was es-
 sential that the Lincoln plant approach the level of
 productivity that has been attained, via JIT/ kan-
 ban, at the parent plant in Japan.
 Lincoln plant management harbored the usual
 doubts about making JIT/kanban work in the U.S.
 culture in which labor and management often are
 viewed as adversaries. But in 1979 inventory prob-
 lems became particularly acute. In particular,
 Kawasaki, Japan, as a key supplier of all motorcycle
 engines plus many other parts, was geared to ship
 parts to the United States in steady quantities
 (knocked down kits of 200 motorcycle equivalents),
 which matched poorly with Lincoln's more erratic
 large-lot-oriented production scheduling. (Included
 in materials from Japan were kits of steel tubing,
 which Kawasaki, Lincoln, fabricates into motor-
 cycle frames in a manufacturing sequence of punch
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 press, welding, and painting. Thus, the Lincoln
 plant has a several-level bill of materials with atten-
 dant potential for work-in-process inventory stock-
 outs and excesses.) A Kawasaki, Japan, study
 group visited the Lincoln plant to try to help resolve
 the problems. One result was that the Lincoln
 management group became convinced that JIT, and
 perhaps kanban, should be pursued and that the
 MRP project should be abandoned.
 Before the end of the year Kawasaki, Lincoln,
 had tried out a simple one-card kanban system for
 feeding certain parts to the production lines. In-
 cluded were about 100 kinds of small "hardware"-
 bolts, washers, nuts, rubber grommets, and so on.
 After a period of marginal success with the kanban
 system, it became clear that the magic is not in the
 kanban card, but that a surer path to productivity
 improvement is to cultivate multiechelon JIT and
 small lot or lotless processing. The tinkering with
 manual order cards (kanban) on the shop floor con-
 tinues. Meanwhile substantive gains have been
 achieved in moving toward JIT. A few examples
 may be noted.
 Production/Capacity Planning
 From the outset the Kawasaki, Lincoln, plant,
 now seven years old, has had the common Japanese
 production/capacity planning strategy: level load,
 but without inventory buildup. In some Japanese
 factories this strategy translates into a lifetime
 employment policy, which is feasible if the company
 is able to control its markets via high quality and
 productivity. Kawasaki, Lincoln's approach is an
 adaptation more consistent with the U.S. socio-
 economic climate: a no-layoff policy.
 In recent months a soft market combined with a
 high rate of productivity improvement has resulted
 in excess labor. The excess is greater than attrition
 can absorb. Consequently, production line workers
 have been available to build a storeroom, calk
 walls, rebuild a frame welding area for JIT parts
 flow, and attach a new JIT-oriented feeder line to
 one of the production lines. This is in keeping with
 the Japanese belief in an informed, involved, ver-
 satile workforce. Workers glimpse the big picture
 and are more able and inclined to offer worthwhile
 suggestions for productivity improvements (Ouchi,
 1981. See, especially, Chapter 3.)
 Organizing for Productivity Improvement
 In Japanese industry manufacturing engineering
 is everyone's business. By one report (Hay, 1981)
 most Toyota foremen are or are studying to be in-
 dustrial engineers, who lead their workers in the
 never-ending job of improving manufacturing
 methods. In Japan such methods analysis often is
 formalized via quality circles-Toyota calls its
 "small group improvement activities." (In repetitive
 manufacturing, quality improvements serve to re-
 duce waste and rework and to smooth the output
 rate, thereby improving productivity. The distinction
 between quality and productivity blurs. Japanese
 quality circles thus are oriented toward both quality
 and productivity improvement, whereas a not un-
 common view in the United States is that quality
 circles are concerned exclusively with quality mat-
 ters.)
 Kawasaki, Lincoln, has no quality circles or other
 formal study groups. But plant management has
 developed a notion that it believes may achieve the
 same results. The idea is to instill in everyone's
 mind a vision of what the plant is evolving toward,
 and to allow wide latitude for the workforce to pur-
 sue the vision in a variety of ways. The vision is
 stated thus: The whole plant is visualized as a series
 of stations on the assembly lines, whether physically
 located there or not.
 The object is JIT production and parts delivery
 with no waste-the same as in Japan. The mech-
 anism is individual American ingenuity. The Jap-
 anese way is to take a long time and seek consensus,
 which helps assure successful implementation. The
 U.S. way is to decide fast without real consensus or
 commitment and then run into an obstacle course in
 the implementation phase. The hybrid approach in
 the Lincoln plant perhaps avoids many of the im-
 plementation obstacles by inculcating (a) a vision of
 an ultimate plant design and (b) a JIT objective for
 plant operation.
 Productivity Improvements
 The plant configuration vision and the JIT objec-
 tive are scarcely a year old, but there are notable
 successes. As has been mentioned, production line
 workers, rebuilt a frame-welding area. Motorcycle
 frame welding had been run as a job shop, with
 frames run in job lots through several welding
 stages, and inventory buildups at each stage. Now
 there are several frame welding lines, each dedicated
 to a particular model of motorcycle. For a given
 model, a number of welding booths are located close
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 together in a line, and a special welding jig is in each
 booth. As a model of frame is run, the product is
 passed piece by piece from booth to booth, with no
 inventory buffers between. Thus, JIT parts move-
 ment has been achieved within frame welding. The
 next step, making frame welding "a station on the
 assembly line," may be achieved in the future
 through implementation of kanban to link frame
 welding to frame painting.
 It also was mentioned earlier that production
 workers had attached a new feeder line to a main
 assembly line. The assembly line for the KIT three-
 wheel motorcycle previously had been supported by
 a separate subassembly area making differentials in
 job lots. The line foreman, apparently imbued with
 the JIT concept, had told industrial engineering that
 he thought differential assembly could be attached
 to the main assembly line. The foreman led the con-
 version project, and today a differential production
 line feeds directly into the KLT line, with a typical
 work-in-process (WIP) inventory of just two dif-
 ferentials.
 Setup Time
 The many delegations from other U.S. plants that
 have visited Kawasaki, Lincoln, are most likely to
 remember the punch presses that are equipped with
 carousel roller conveyors for die storage. The con-
 veyors keep the dies at just the right height for
 quick and easy attachment to the fixture. It now
 takes about 10 minutes to set up for a new model of
 framing tube versus hours for the same setup a year
 ago. It now is economical to run tube fabrication
 operations in the same small lot sizes (200) as for
 parts kits received from Japan-as opposed to lot
 sizes in the thousands before the carousel die storage
 and transfer conveyors were developed.
 JIT Purchasing
 JIT purchasing is common in Japan, but perhaps
 the only well-established case of it in the United
 States is with TRI-CON, a Kawasaki motorcycle
 seat supplier. In 1977 Tokyo Seat Company estab-
 lished its TRI-CON subsidiary near the Kawasaki
 plant in Lincoln, Nebraska. TRI-CON's motivation
 was to become indispensable by locating close
 enough to be able to react quickly to any quality or
 delivery requirements that Kawasaki might have.
 The striking feature of the service provided by TRI-
 CON is its twice a day deliveries. More-than-daily
 delivery generally is unheard of in the United States
 in discrete manufacturing; once a month is more
 typical.
 In 1981 the Kawasaki purchasing manager began
 training his buyers and other staff in JIT purchasing
 concepts. Several JIT-oriented purchase agreements
 are in various stages of development. The idea is to
 establish very high quality, responsive suppliers, in
 the Lincoln vicinity where possible, and enjoy the
 mutual advantages of long term JIT agreements:
 low inventories (which the supplier also may achieve
 via JIT agreements with its suppliers), avoidance of
 large lots of defectives (because there are no large
 lots), and stability of the supplier-buyer relationship.
 Plant Configurations for JIT Operations
 As some of the above examples indicate, Kawa-
 saki, Lincoln's productivity improvements are gained
 by moving away from job-shop and toward multi-
 echelon lotless repetitive production. There are
 several possible plant configurations along the way,
 as Figure 2 illustrates using welding booths as the
 example. The first configuration, Part A, is that of
 a job shop. Each welding booth has access to weld-
 ing jigs, which hold steel tubing in place for welding
 into frames. Job orders specify frame model, order
 quantity, and routing from booth to booth. Dis-
 patch lists note which job order to run next at par-
 ticular booths, and move tags assist in the transfer
 between booths.
 Part B shows the extensive physical changeover
 to welding production lines, which is the present
 configuration in the Lincoln plant. Each line is
 dedicated to a particular model, which eliminates
 the changing of jigs in a given booth. This is a layout
 concept known as group technology (GT), which
 the British write about (Burbidge, 1975) and the
 Japanese extensively employ. Shop paper is reduced
 to a daily schedule by frame model. WIP buffer/
 queuing inventories drop to zero, and inventories of
 completed frames awaiting transfer to painting
 drop from, typically, many days' supply to a max-
 imum of one or two days' worth.
 Part C shows how Kawasaki, Lincoln, plans
 eventually to cut down the day's worth of finished
 frames by implementing kanban. Kanban is a pull
 system in which the downstream work center pulls,
 via a kanban card, more parts from upstream fab-
 rication areas. Because kanban meshes fabrication
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 Figure 2
 Plant Configurations
 A. Welding Booths; Job-Shop Configuration
 Jig storage
 [EH] EB1 E E
 Notes:
 1. Numbered boxes represent welding booths.
 2. Jobs are routed between all pairs of booths.
 3. Frames in various welded states, symbol X: may be
 several days' supply at each booth.
 4. Shop paper for every booth:
 o Job orders
 o Dispatch lists
 o Move tags
 B. Dedicated Welding Lines
 Frame }----
 Frame
 Notes:
 1. Completed frames, symbol X: one or two days'
 maxium supply for each line.
 2. Shop paper for each line:
 o A daily schedule
 C. Dedicated Welding Lines with Kanban Cards
 Notes: ?
 1. Completed frames, symbol X: one or a few
 standard containers' full.
 2. Shop paper for each line:
 o One kanban card for each empty container arriving
 from downstream work center (i.e., paint)
 D. Dedicated Welding Lines Physically Connected to Paint and Final Assembly
 Welding lines
 I -'] __ - Paint
 AIV U A < LFinal
 assembly
 line
 Notes:
 1. Shop paper for welding and paint: none.
 aAdapted from Schonberger, Sutton, and Claunch, 1981.
 output with assembly usage-always somewhat
 variable-the kanban system cuts buffer stocks.
 (When production is run to a schedule, as in MRP,
 it is a push system, i.e., the scheduled run is made
 and the finished parts are pushed downstream,
 whether downstream work centers need them or
 not.)
 In Part D the last bit of buffer inventory and the
 last bit of shop paper are removed-by physically
 wedding the dedicated feeder line to main assembly.
 The Lincoln plant may never achieve this configura-
 tion for welding frames, which then go to painting
 before feeding to final assembly. But, as has been
 described, this configuration has been achieved for
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 feeding differentials into the KLT assembly line.
 Flexibility
 The primary advantages of JIT and repetitive
 production are lower costs and prices with better
 quality. To some degree these benefits are gained at
 the expense of product line variety. A JIT/repetitive
 manufacturer is likely to offer fewer models and
 styles than an MRP company. Typically, for exam-
 ple, Japanese auto manufacturers have offered a
 narrower line of models than have U.S. counter-
 parts. If a repetitive manufacturer is to offer a good
 deal of variety, that variety should be within fairly
 narrow limits, for example, a variety of chrome
 trim styles, all of which are similar enough to be
 formed from the same material on the same machine
 tool engineered for quick setup changeovers.
 At the same time JIT leads to increased flexibility
 and market responsiveness. Because all parts man-
 ufacturing is geared to the final assembly rate, the
 total production lead time is very short, as com-
 pared with job-lot producers. JIT plants, including
 Kawasaki, Lincoln, make the most of their capacity
 for market responsiveness by generally resisting the
 temptation to make parts simply in order to keep an
 expensive machine busy. Instead, a sales-oriented
 master schedule dictates machine usage. When
 model changeover and machine-tool setup times
 have been drastically reduced, assembly lines and
 fabrication centers may be balanced to run mixed
 models. The daily model mix produced is closely
 matched to the daily marketing mix distributed and
 sold, so that finished goods inventories may be lean
 and still provide a high rate of service (few model
 stockouts) to final customers. Internally, informa-
 tion linkages (e.g., via kanban) serve to keep fab-
 rication centers, and even suppliers, making the
 same model mix as is being run in final assembly,
 with appropriate offsets for leadtime-sometimes
 only a matter of hours (e.g., the four-hour response
 time for TRI-CON to deliver seats to the Kawasaki,
 Lincoln, plant).
 MRP in its most advanced forms (i.e., MRP II)
 has the admirable capability of providing integrated
 planning of manufacturing and financial resources
 forward to distribution centers and backward to
 suppliers. Fully developed multiechelon JIT also in-
 tegrates forward and backward but with only a
 fraction of the inventories, computer processing,
 and planning documentation. It is not easy, or
 cheap, to become a JIT/repetitive manufacturer,
 and plants whose mission is to provide product
 variety are limited in how far they can progress
 toward JIT/repetitive processing; MRP may be
 necessary. But, based on the still limited informa-
 tion on the Kawasaki, Lincoln, experience, the JIT
 approach is workable in the United States, and a
 certain amount of conversion to such a mode of
 operation may be necessary if U.S. industry is to
 compete with the Japanese.
 Future Research
 For many production/operation management
 (P/OM) practitioners in the United States, there is
 an element of deja vu in learning about the Japanese
 JIT approach. A similar period of enlightenment
 was experienced in the 1970s in connection with
 MRP. Orlicky (1975) had concluded that order
 quantities, the focal point of inventory management
 for nearly half a century, were really unimportant
 as compared with order timing. Converts to MRP
 adopted this conclusion with close to religious fervor.
 It seemed unlikely that there would be a second
 period of enlightenment in the 1980s and that it
 would feature a return to the view that lot sizes may
 indeed be a key to successful production and inven-
 tory management. Yet that is part of the JIT
 message, and Japanese industrial success with
 small-lot and lotless JIT processing is convincing.
 Such developments open up a host of research
 opportunities for the P/OM academician. For one
 thing, considerable thought and study are needed to
 sort out the proper areas of application for lot-
 oriented MRP versus relatively lotless JIT/kanban.
 The issue is complicated in that it relates to the cen-
 tral question of what a given manufacturing firm
 has been, is, and can be. At one extreme is a lot-
 oriented job shop geared for variety, which is the
 way that many manufacturers start out, and at the
 other extreme is a repetitive OEM firm geared for
 the mass markets, which many might aspire to
 become.
 There also are important operational issues that
 beg attention. What is the best system design for a
 given plant and how may it be discovered and im-
 plemented? Yamaha in Japan has devised what
 seems to be an ingenious fusion of kanban and MRP,
 suitable for its situation as a repetitive manufacturer
 dependent on numerous job-lot-oriented fabrication
 shops. Kanban cards control parts feeding final
 486
 assembly, and synchro cards, computer-produced
 by a highly advanced version of MRP, trigger orders
 from the job-lot oriented fabrication shops (APICS,
 1981). The academic researcher, along with con-
 sultants and practitioners, surely have this sort of
 innovative design work to do in a variety of in-
 dustries.
 The fundamental truths seem to be not yet fully
 known, much less the details. Understanding Jap-
 anese JIT and examining attempts in the United
 States to borrow from the Japanese answer some
 questions but open up many new ones.
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